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TRADE NAMES
Words or phrases" which have been in common 
2 use and
which indicate truly the character, kind, quality, or composition
of an article of commerce may not be appropriated by any one
to his exclusive use.3 - "Whatever is mere description is open to
all the world." 4 These words are common property and part of
the common stock of the language.
5 Any one may use them to
designate a similar article. No manufacturer may impoverish
the English language while giving names to his goods. While the
court should be swift to prevent the pirating of a tradesman's
property, its zeal should not go to the extent of permitting him to
appropriate to himself a common word. To allow any other
course would be to grant a monopoly in the sale of the goods
called by the name, or to forbid a second tradesman to make a
correct and truthful designation of his article.
6  No injunction is
given against telling the truth ' and all who may signify a fact
with equal truth by the same word symbols have the right to do
so.8 In England descriptive words may be registered in connec-
tion with a distinctive device and no right to exclusive use comes
therefrom. The fact that the words are "catchy and slangy"
1 On trade names we may mention the following magazine articles:
30 L. J. 127 (1895), 29 L. J. 154 (1894, 21 Am. L. Reg. N. S. 644 (1882),
22 Am. L. Reg. N. S. 509 (1883), 12 Cent. L. J. 6 (1886), 70 L. T. 148
(1881), 4th Series 23 L. Mag. & Rev. 299 (1898).
2Le Clanche Co. v. Western Co., 23 Fed. 276; Lorillard v. Piper, 86
Fed. 956; Sterling Co. v. Spermine Co., 112 Fed. 1000; Noel v. Ellis, 86
Off. Gaz. 633; Lewis v. Klapproth, 11 V. L. R. 214; Elgin Co. v. Ill. Co.,
(Sup. Ct.) 94 Off. Gaz. 755; Marshall v. Pinkham, 52 Wis. 572; Pace, Tal-
bott & Co. Ex parte, 16 Off. Gaz. 909; Pinto v. Trott, 8 R. P. C. 173;
Slazenger v. Pigott, 12 R. P. C. 439; Burton v. Stratton, 12 Fed. 696;
Searle v. Warner, 112 Fed. 674.
3 Alden v. Gross, 25 Mo. App. 123; Caswell v. Dazis, 4 Abb. Pr. N. S.
6; Hehnbold v. Helnbold, 53 How. Pr. 453.
4 Cheavin v. Walker, 5 Ch. D. 850; Gilnan v. Hunnewell, 122 Mass.
139, 58 N. Y. 223.
5Peerless Carbon Black Co. .Ex parte, 81 Off. Gaz. 803; Brennan v.
Emory, 99 Fed. 971, 108 Fed. 624; Canada Co. v. British Columbia Co.,
6 B. C. Rep. 377; Asbestos Co. v. Sclater, 10 Que. K. B. 165, 18 Que. S. C.
324.
GD. & H. Canal Co. v. Clark, 1 Off. Gaz. 279; Town v. Stetson, 3
Daly 53, 5 Abb. Pr. N. S. 218, Grossmith Re. 6 R. P. C. 180.
U. S. Co. v. U. S. Co., 83 Hun. 572.
-Atkins Re., 3 R. P. C. 164.
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and do not express the quality in the most grammatical form,
does not deprive them of their descriptiveness.
Words which simply indicate the superiority, popularity, or
universality in use of the tradesman's goods cannot be exclusively
appropriated. 10 The use of such w9rds may facilitate competi-
tion, but is not unfair competition.
Descriptive words may be of any part of speech: nouns, verbs,
or adjectives. 1 These words are frequently referred to by the
courts as "generic terms," because they denote the kind of article
on which they are used.
The fact that the claimant of a descriptive word or phrase in-
vented it gives him no right to its exclusive use. 2  Coining a
word adds nothing to its value as a trade name. Nor does one
gain right to restrain subsequent use by another in good faith
from the fact that the former was for a time the only person using
the descriptive name.28  Words which are descriptive can not be
good trade names, though they also indicate origin and maker. 4
They must express only the latter, to be distinctive.
A word in common use, taken from the body of the language,
cannot be appropriated as a trade name, unless it be applied to an
article in an arbitrary and fanciful way, having no natural appli-
cation to it. The name must not stand for the machine, but for
the machine of a particular maker to be considered distinctive.'1
Where the question of descriptiveness is doubtful, these border
line words are usually held to be descriptive in the interests of
freedom of trade.16
While a descriptive word may not be exclusively appropriated.
-yet a court will enjoin a person from using the word on goods so
9 Hance Bros., Ex parte) 87 Off. Gaz. 698.
10 Proctor v. Globe Co., 92 Fed. 357; Wolfe v. Burke, 7 Lansing 151.
21 Capital City Co., Ex parte, 83 Off. Gaz. 295; Ginter v. Kinney, 22
Off. Gaz. 770.
12 Goodyear Co., Ex parte, 11 Off. Gaz. 1062; Cal. Fig Syrup Co. v.
Stearns, 73 Fed. 812.
lsMontgomerie v. Donald, 4 Ct. Ses. Cas. XI, 506, yet the fact that
others have used the word for similar products is strong evidence that it
is descriptive. Lewis v. Klapproth, 11 V. L. R. 214; Ripley v. Griffiths,
19 R. P. C. 590. But see Yorkshire Relish cases.
14 Caswell v. Davis, 58 N. Y. 223.
15 Cooke v. Miller, 65 N. Y. Supp. 730, 169 N. Y. 475; Computing Co.
v. Standard Co., 118 Fed. 965.
1e Beadleston v. Cooke, 76 Off. Gaz. 1576.
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as to pass them off for another's and deceive purchasers.
' You
may take advantage of the celebrity of a descriptive name to in-
duce men to buy your goods, if they can be brought to believe
that yours are as good as the other trader's, but you must not
represent your goods as his, nor deprive him of his legitimate
trade by fraud. The fact that the word is an old one gives no
more reason for allowing fraudulent use to be made of it than if
it were new."8 A man may tell the truth, but may not practice
duplicity in a secondary meaning of the terms he uses.
19
The burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to show 20 that de-
scriptive words are used by defendants "as, in effect, to represent
or to have a tendency to make people suppose that the thing ad-
vertised" by them is the plaintiff's article,
2
1 for an exclusive
right to words is more burdensome than one to symbols. Ii
other words, the descriptive word must be shown to have been
used by the defendants in a secondary meaning. So Yorkshire
Relish was protected by the courts when the plaintiff proved that
the universal understanding of the public was that the words re-
ferred to an article made by him according to a secret process,
and a new maker of a compound called by that title was not al-
lowed to use the words even in connection with his own name.
The mere fact that some confusion results from the use of the
descriptive name by defendant need .not be sufficient to cause re-
straint of such use.2 2  But while a tradesmah may choose an
euphonious word indicating the ingredients of which his product
is composed, 23 he may not coin or use a word sufficiently indi-
cative of the quality and character of his article to be invalid as
a trademark and sufficiently like another tradesman's name to ob-
tain the benefit of an infringement.
17 Lewis v. Klapproth, 11 V. L. R. 214; Wolfe v. Alsop, 12 V. L. R.
421, 887; Burland Re., 6 R. P. C. 482; Ayer v. Rushton, 7 Daly 9; Cal.
Fig. Syrup Co. v. Stearns, 73 Fed. 812; Randall v. British Shoe Co., 19 R.
P. C. 393; Nokes v. Mueller, 72 Ill. App. 431; Shaver v. Heller, 108 Fed.
821; Meyer v. Bull, 66 Off. Gaz. 1755; Moxie Co. v. - , 43 Off. Gaz.
88; Sterling Co. v. Spermine Co., 112 Fed. 1000.
Is Newman v. Alvord, 49 Barb. 588.
29 Army & Navy Soc. v. Army & Navy Civil Service Soc., 19 R. P. C.
574; Dunn Re., 7 R. P. C. 311.
20 Wilson v. Lyman, 25 Ont. A. R. 303. (But see Dunn Re, 7 R. F. C.
311.)
21111. Watch Co. v. Elgin Co., 87 Off. Gaz. 2323; Powell v. Birming-
ham Co., 12 R. P. C. 496, 11 R. P. C. 563, 13 R. P. C: 235, 1 R. P. C. 1, 720.
22 Robinson v. Bogle, 18 Ont. R. 387.
23 Fairbank v. Central Lard Co., 70 Off. Gaz. 635.
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When a word is once determined to be of a descriptive nature,
it does not become distinctive because the definitive article is pre-
fixed to it,- ' nor can that article distinguish two names of
articles.
25
The use of capital letters 26 for syllables or words not usually
so written, does not change them from descriptive to distinctive.
Nor can there be injunction against a method of pronunciation.2 7
Hyphenation 28 of the syllables of a descriptive word, or of two
or more descriptive words, does not make a distinctive trade
name. In any case, only a close observer notes such an arrange-
ment.
Equally ineffective is the attempt to turn a descriptive word or
phrase into an arbitrary one by printing it in ornamental or in
script type, or by placing some flourishes colorably around the
descriptive matter.29  Protection is sought for the wbrds, not for
the form in which they appear.
Another ineffective device resorted to by tradesmen to secure
distinctiveness for their names is misspelling. When spoken, the
words still convey the descriptive idea. Thus Kas-K-Rilla,30 Kid
Nee Kure,31 Cantripum Clothing,"2 Kleanwell Massage Gloves,33
are descriptive. So are Uneeda Biscuit 3 ' and Pirle .Clothes
(Pearl),3 which phrase was alleged by the applicant Ripley with
what the court called a "rather poor attempt at humor," to be an
anagram of his name without the final letter.
24Ex pare Rome Co., 91 Off. Gaz. 820; Re Stapley, L. R. 29 Ch. D.
877; lennings Ex parte, Newt. Dig. 68.
2 5 Lane v. Smythe; 46 N. J. Eq. 443.
26 Seager Ex parte, 97 Off. Gaz. 749; Henderson Ex pare, 85 Off.
Gaz. 453.
27 Lechy v. Glover, 10 R. P. C. 141.
2 8 Seager Es porte, 97 Off. Gaz. 749; Crescent Mfg. Co., Ex parte,.97
Off. Gaz. 750; Bronson Ex parte, 87 Off. Gaz. 1783; Weil Ex parte, 84
Off. Gaz. 309; Pew Ex parte, Newt. Dig. 103.2)Seager Ex parte, 97 Off. Gaz. 749; Miani Co. Ex parte, 100 Off.
Gaz. 1975; Price Re, 56 L. R. Ch. 653; Clement Re, 16 R. P. C. 611.30 Seager Ex pare, 97 Off. Gaz. 749.
31 Henderson Ex" parte, 85 Off. Gaz. 453.
3 Hooker Ex parte, 108 Off. Gaz. 289.
33SSmith Ex parte, 110 Off. Gaz. 601.
84 Uneeda Re, 1901, 1 Ch. 500; National Biscuit Co. Re, 18 R. P. C.
170, 19 1. P. C. 281.
3-- Ripley Re, 15 R. P. C. 151.
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Spelling a word 6 as it is spelled in a foreign language does
not make it distinctive.
When the arrangement of the letters or words in the trader's
name is unusual, but the descriptive name plainly appears,
3 7 he
has not succeeded in making a distinctive term.
38 Thus Nevers-
Tick Lubricants " and Pain-Ease Medicine 4
0 are not arbitrary.
To say a medicine eases a pain is merely to describe, and a "mere
reversal of the usual order in which the words are written" does
not make them arbitrary.
A syncopation of a descriptive word by omission of a syllable
does not make it distinctive.41
Writing several words as one does not make them distinctive,'
2
The coupling of words previously used apart, but known to the
common or scientific world, gives no right to the exclusive use of
the combination. A phrase made up of several descriptive words
is no more capable of exclusive possession than are the words
which compose it.'3
Prefixing" a proprietor's name to descriptive words does not
make the name distinctive.
To show that the word is descriptive, it must appear that the
word gives some reasonably accurate information and is a rea-
sonably sufficient description. It need not give a "complete and
exhaustive indication of all that the preparation contains," but
must be "reasonably indicative," as commonly used by those who
understand the meaning.'
The use of descriptive words similar to plaintiff's may be evi-
dence tending to show that his distinctive word was deceptively
intended.'0
30 Kipling Ex parte, 24 Off. Gaz. 898.
37 Taber Ex parte, 96 Off. Gaz. 1036.
38 Columbia Co: Ex parte, 96 Off. Gaz. 1036.
39 Woolworth Ex parte, 100 Off. Gaz. 1976.
40 Evans Ex parte, 96 Off. Gaz. 425.
"1 Hutchins Ex parte, 100 Off. Gaz. 1330.
42 West Ex parte, 100 Off. Gaz. 682; Miller Ex parte, 95 Off. Gaz.
1452; Smith Ex parte, 110 Off. Ga., 601.
4 'Caswell v. Davis, 4 Abb. Pr. N. S. 6, 54 N. Y. 223; Lawrence Ex
parte, 10 Off. Gaz. 163; Graham Ex parte, 2 Off. Gaz. 618.
" Brown v. Meyer, 31 Fed. 453, 55 Off. Gaz. 287 (U. S. Sup. Ct.).
45 Keasbey v. Brooklyn Works, 142 N. Y. 467; (Acid Phosphate)
Rumford v. Muth, 35 Fed. 522; (Flaked Oatmeal) -Parsons v. Gillespie,
15 R. P. C. 57.
46 Sterling Co. v. Spermine Co., 112 Fed. 1000.
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QUASI DESCRIPTIVE NAMES-COMMON TO THE TRADE.
It sometimes is found that a term which may have been dis-
tinctive and even the name of an individual, by long usage as
generic, has lost its distinctiveness and has become descriptive of
a class of goods.' Thus the word Manny 2 was held to have
been so applied to a certain kind of harvesters as to have ceased
to be registerable as a trademark and to have become publici juris.
The same rule was held to cover Calhoun plows,$ Edison phono-
graphs,4 and Liebig's Extract of Beef.' The true test is to decide
whether a purchaser of goods, e.g. Barber's Knives, would think
he was getting one made by Barber, or one of a certain pattern.6
In New Zealand it has been held 7 that a well known substance,
made under a publici juris recipe and sold under a name in-
vented by the first seller and registered as a trademark by him,
may be sold under the same name by any other, unless he repre-
sents it as a manufacture of the inventor of the name. So Fowl-
er's Solution of Arsenic has gained a so-called generic sense.$
When the use has been so general that any one may use the word,
it is said to be publici juris. Publici juris words frequently used
by tradesmen in a certain line of goods are said to be common
to the trade. Of course, the true test 9 is whether the use of the
word "has ceased to deceive the public" as to the maker of the
article and whether the word is current in the market among
those "who are more or less directly connected with the use of
the commodity to which the word is applied." Nothing can be
common to the trade, which is used by only one person in the
trade and surreptitious use can not make a word publici juris.10
"The courts have gone a long way, and with plain justice, in
protecting the honest and enterprising manufacturer of any good
and useful article from the unscrupulous pirating of his special
reputation, but they have been equally careful to prevent any at-
tempted monopoly of that which is common to all." 21 When
four men or more were found to have used the same trademark
'Hohner v. Gratz, 52 Fed. 871.
2 Graham Ex parte, 2 Off. Gaz. 618.
3 Hall v. Atkinson, 13 Off. Gaz. 229.
4Edison v. Hawthorne, 106 Fed. 173, 108 Fed. 839.
5 Liebig & Co. v. Libby, 103 Fed. 87.
a Barber v. Manico, 10 R. P. C. 93.
7 Marshall v. Hawkins, 4 N. Z. L. R. S. C. 59, Cura Clava medicines.
sBurton v. Stratton, 12 Fed. 696.
9 Stuart v. Scottish, etc., Co., 4 Ct. Sess. Cas. XIII-1 ; Searle v. War-
ner, 112 Fed. 674.
lo Thompson v. Montgomery, 6 R. P. C. 404; Barlow v. Johnson, 7
R. P. C. 395.
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in England, in 1876, it was held 1 2 to be common to the trade.
The question is to be determined, according to the usage in the
forum, and not in some other country, and the word, if publici
juris, must be known generally to the trade and even to the
public; not merely to a few people scattered here and there.
1 3
The fact that the name was once used by others than the trader
who claims it will not make it publici juris if it is no longer used
by them, but now denotes only the trader's goods.
14 Other ex-
amples of terms held publici juris are as follows: Imperial, in
connection with oysters and probably with candy,
15 Gold Leaf
Flour,1 6 Victoria Lozenges, 7 Selected Pens,'
8 Country Soap,",
L. L. Sheetings, meaning 4-yard goods,
20 Mandarin Tea,2 ' Tycoon
Tea, 22 Maizena (in Victoria,23 and in New South Wales,
24 where
use for 25 years was unquestioned by the original owner of the
name), S.P. to the snuff trade,25 Bradshaw's Guide (in New
Zealand), 2 6 Ne Plus Ultra in needle trade,
2 7 Bazaar Patterns,2 8
titles of nobility, such as Baron applied to Liebig,
2' Taend Stikker
(fire stick) in the match trade, 0 Hunyadi Water,
3 ' Employer's
Liability Insurance,82 even though plaintiff was the first company
in the business.
"1 Town v. Stetson, 5 Abb. Pr. N. S. 218.
12 Hughes Re, 10 R. P. C. 369. Where three people use the name and
at least two of them innocently, there is nto proprietorship in it. Paine v
Daniell, 10 R. P. C. 71, 217.
18 Hornsby v. Hudson, 11 N. S. W. L. R. Eq. 148; Powell v. Birming
ham Co., 13 R. P. C. 235.
14 Symnonds v Greene, 28 Fed. Rep. 834.
15 Whitstable Co. v. Hayling, 17 R. P. C. 461; Watson v. Westlake,
11 Ont. R. 449.
' 6 Partlo v. Todd, 12 Ont. R. 171.
17 Wotherspoon v. Gray, 3 Ct. Sess. Cas. 11-38.
48 Mitchell Re, 1878, W. N. 101.
10 Wrigley v. Rouse, 87 Fed. 589.
20 Lawrence Co. v. Tenn. Co., 31 Fed. 776, 55 Off. Gaz. 1528.
21 British &c. Ass.. v. Cooke, Sebastian, 353, 354.
22 Corbin v. Gould, 51 Off. Gaz. 622.
23 National Co. v. Munn, 13 N. S. W. L. R. Eq. 101.
24 National Co. v. Munn, 11 R. P. C. 281.
25 Sales, Pollard & Co., Ex parte, 25 Sol. J. 833.
26 Reid v. Bishop, 4 N. Z. L. R. S. C. 222.
2 7 Beard v. Turner, 13 L. T. N. S. 746.
2 8 McCall v. Theal, 28 Gr. U. C. Ch. 48.
29 Liebig v. Anderson, 1882 W. N. 147; Anderson Re, L. R. 26, Ch. D.
409. Possibly Pippers Signal Oil is another example; Weston v. Ketcham,
51 How. 455.
30 Christiansen Re, 3 R. P. C. 54.
81 Saxlehnir v. Eisner, 88 Fed. Rep. 61, 91 Fed. 531.
82 Employers' Corp. v. Employers' Co., 24 Abb. Pr. N. C. 368.
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PROPRIETARY NAMES.
Certain words or phrases are so distinctive in their character
that they are registrable under the trademark law and become a
peculiar property of the tradesman using them, so that the use
of them by a rival tradesman is ipso facto fraud,' even though
he associate his name with -the trade name. "A purely arbitrary
or fanciful appellation, .for the first time, used to distinguish an
article, to which it has no natural or necessary relation, does, by
virtue of that very appropriation and subsequent use, become a
trademark." 2 Of course, this right only extends to the use of
the name with the particular goods to which it has been applied.'
The use of the word must be a new one and the article must not
be known to the trade by the name claimed as distinctive.' The
distinctiveness needed is in connection with the class of goods to
which the word is applied. A distinctive word is one which oper-
ates to show that the goods. to which it is applied are different
from the similar goods of all other tradesmen. Thus it must
indicate origin and ownership and have become, by adoption and
use, the proper appellation of the article,3 for there is no property
in any name abstractly considered.6 If the word be a newly coined
one, there is a presumption in favor of its distinctiveness, for such
word "brings with it such an element -of novelty, as of itself to
attract attention," and prevent the confusion of ordinary purchas-
ers of the articleea But whether a new word or not, protection is
given '7 whenever there is a new use of a name to distinguish one
tradesman's goods from those of others and when the public have
generally adopted the name to designate his articles.
1 Brennan v. Emery, 108 Fed. 624; Burton v. Stratton, 12 Fed. 696;
Syroonds v. Jones, 82 Me. 302; Pike Co. v. Cleveland Co., 45 Off. Gaz. 947.
2 Allegheny Co. v. Woodside, Fed. Cas. 206; Falkinburg v. Lucy, 35
Cal. 52; Grillon v. Guerin, 1877 W. N: 14; Singer v. Wilson, 3 A. C. 371.
3 Rowley v. Houghton, 2 Brewst. 303.
4 Van Bell v. Prescott, 82 N. Y. 630; Braham v. Bustard, 1 H. & M.
447; Faulder Re, 18 R. P. C. 37, 535; Bodega v. Riviere, 6 R. P. C. 236,
7 R. P. C. 31.
5 Ferguson ,. Davol Mills, 2 Brewst 314; Am. Chem. Co., Ex parte,
62 Off. Gaz. 588; Caswell v. Davis, 4 Abb. Pr. N. S. 6, 58 N. Y. 223;
Celluloid Co. v. Cellonite Co., 41 Off. Gaz. 693.
6 Wallach v. Wigmore, 87 Fed. 469.
6a Pa. Co. v. Myers, 79 Fed. 87.
7 Selchow v. Baker, 11 Daly 353, 93 N. Y. 59.
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It is not necessary that the word be impressed on the goods or
packages containing them and thus become a trademark s in order
to secure it protection from fraud. If distinctive, it may be
appropriated as a trade name by use, through word of mouth
alone, so as to come to mean the goods of one trader. An arbi-
trary word is a mere symbol that the goods are made by the
tradesman whose labors created them.'
In a doubtful case, the fact that the complainant coined the
word and was the only person to use it for 4o years, and until
defendant began to do so, would turn the scale in the former's
favor.
The words which compbse a trade name need not be new. If
the combination be a new one,10 which points to the origin and
ownership of the goods, it will be unlawful for another tradesman
to filch the whole combination or any important part of it.
The defendant's goods, in the absence of patent, may be pre-
cisely like the plaintiff's, but the name must not be one calculated
to deceive the ordinary purchaser. 1 A distinctive name may be-
long to the language of the country and be employed rightfully
in other connections, but must not be so used as to defraud indi-
viduals or deceive the public.
2
The characteristics of a good trade name 1S are that it has been
selected arbitrarily, that it is not expressive of the quality or char-
acter of the article, and that it has not previously been appro-
priated by any other person to designate a similar commodity.
Distinctive words denote the manufacture, selection, or other
operation done by the user to the goods.14 They must distinguish
article or maker. A name which one has a right to use cannot be
registered as part of trademark of another."
When a new article is made, a name must be given it 1" and
8 Singer v. Loog, 8 A. C. 26; McLean v. Fleming, 96 U. S. 245.
' Hygeia Co. v. Hygeia Co., 70 Conn. 516.
10 Wolfe v. Barnett, 24 La. Ann. 97; Canterbury Co. v. Christ Church
Co., 8 N. Z. L. R. 49.
11 Comstock v. Morse, 18 How. Pr. 421; Sedon v. Senate, 2 V. & B.
220.
12Matsell v. Flanagan, 2 Abb: N. S. 459; Godillot v. Harris, 81 N. Y.
263.
"8 Smith v. Sixbury, 32 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 232.
'4 Davis Re, 5 R. P. C. 333.
15Ferne v. Wilson, 26 Vic. L. R. 422.
"6Hostetter v. Fries, 17 Fed. 621; Wolfe v. Burke, 7 Lansing 151;
Searle v. Warner, 112 Fed. 674.
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this name becomes, by common acceptation, the appropriate de-
scriptive term by which it is known, and so is public property. All
who have the right to make the article have the right to apply the
name to it, provided they do not pass off their goods as another's.
Otherwise a person could acquire an exclusive right to a formula
by giving a name to an unpatented compound. In considering the
name of a medicine, a Federal Court said, "The flowering into
popular language of the more or less restricted nomenclature of a
useful medical advance cannot thus be imprisoned or cut off."
To prove an exclusive right to a word it must be shown that
it is of an arbitrary or fanciful nature 17 or that, being originally
descriptive, it has come by use to denote plaintiff's goods. The
English cases are especially insistent upon this."' "A name should
have, to the whole of the trade and to all persons who have any
knowledge of the article in question, the sole meaning sought to be
attached to it by the plaintiff; that is to say, the original primary
meaning must have been eliminated from the .dictionary of the
persons who deal in this article in the trade and of all other per-
sons whom it may concern to know it. Then the use by another
is; necessarily, fraudulent, because the universal signification af-
fects the defendant's mind, as well as the minds of the rest of the
persons interested. Where the primary meaning of a suitably de-
scriptive word subsists in trade use,19 although among a numer-
ically inferior section of a trade, alongside of a secondary mean-
ing in a larger section of that trade, the primary meaning will not
be held to be displaced. In other words, to determine whether a
word is descriptive or not, "one must not regard it from an etymo-
logical point of view, . . . but from the ordinary point of view
*which would be taken by the ordinary British subject, dealing with
the particular goods." 
20
Under the English Trademark Act of 1883, a trade name to be
registered 21 must be "a fancy word or words not in common use."
This was amended by the act of I888, so as to read "an invented
17 Parsons v. Gillespie, 15 R. P. C. 57.
Is Chivers v. Chivers, 17 R. P. C. 420; Ripley v. Grifllths, 19 R. P. C.
590; Schove v. Schmincke, 30 Ch. D. 546.
19 Cellular Clothing Co. v. Riley & Maxton, 15 R. P. C. 581.
20 Linotype Co. Re, 14 R. P. C. 900.
21 A term may be so descriptive as not to be registered and yet may be
capable of appropriation by adoption and user, so as to receive protection
by courts against infringement by a rival trader. Paine v. Daniell, 10
R. P. "C. 71, 217; Williams v. Mitchell, 106 Fed. 168; Sebastian, p. 331.
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word, or invented words, or a word or words, having 
no refer-
ence to the character or quality of the goods and 
not being a geo-
graphical name." The obvious purpose of these 
provisions was
to prevent the registry of descriptive names, and 
a number of in-
teresting decisions were made thereunder. It was first 
supposed
that the term fancy word would include any word fancifully 
ap-
plied, which would have been protected 
under the Common Law.
2 2
"Where the use of a word not unknown at the 
time of its first
employment is quite different from its ordinary use 
and the appli-
cation is so different that it is seen at the first glance that 
the word
is being used quite out of its common signification, 
where its
application is so novel and striking as to be the creation 
of fancy,
it appears to me, that it serves as a mark to distinguish 
the goods
as being the production of a particular manufacturer's 
just as
well in all respects as when the word itself is fanciful." 
The
question is not one of grammar, nor of literary invention, 
but of
trade. The Court of Appeal, however, held that a fancy 
word was
one "which obviously can not have reference to my 
description, or
designation, of where the article is made or what are 
its charac-
teristics." 23 A fancy word need not be one which 
cannot be
found in the dictionary, but must not properly be applied 
to the
goods 24 so as to "convey any meaning to any ordinary 
English-
man."2 5 It must be so obviously meaningless and inappropriate
as neither to be "descriptive, nor deceptive, nor calculated 
to sug-
gest deception or description," and must further have "an inherent.
character of fancifulness." This doctrine led to a series 
of de-
cisions, some of which are ridiculous in 
the extreme view taken.
2 6
Sebastian 27 says in only five cases, one of which was 
afterwards
disapproved, was a word upheld as a trademark, while 
others
seem to show a reaction from the extreme view at first 
taken.
The following are examples of the Courts' views: Jubilee 
note
22 Stapley Re, L. R. 29, Ch. D. 877.
25 Van Duzer Re, 34 Ch. D. 623; Leaf Re, 34 Ch. D. 632, 4 R. P. C. 31.
24 If a word merely "indicates a commendation of the excellence of
the article" and does not connect it with any particular maker 
it is de-
scriptive. Arbenz Re, 4 R. P. C. 143.
25 In a later case, Davis v. Stribolt, 6 R. P. C. 207, the court went
further and said, "The fact that an ordinary Englishman would not 
under-
stand the word is no test of fancifulness, for he would not understand
many good descriptive words."
2s A trade name cannot be an ordinary English word, whose applica-
tion only is fanciful. Townsend v. Pirie, 4 R. P. C. 67.
2T Sebastian, pp. 39 and 40.
TRADE NAMES
paper is "not obviously non-descriptive," but might mean paper
made in Victoria's Jubilee Year. Reversi is descriptive of a game
of reverses, 2 Red, White and Blue Coffee is not a fancy term,"
Kokoko meant owl in the Chippewa language and, as a figure of
an owl was already registered for cotton goods, the word could
not be considered distinctive. 0 If a trade should spring up with
the Chippewas, they might become confused between the two
makes of goods, as the word and figure were true alternatives in
their language. Satinine Starch ,1 is made up with "marvellous
little invention" and is refused registry as descriptive of the effect
of the article, every one knowing that starched goods are glossy.
A word was not a fancy word 2 because it denoted a non-existent
thing, e.g. Griffin, nor would a Latin termination render a word
a fancy one. The word "star" cannot be appropriated,3 3 though
one may have a "particular phrase in which the word 'star' is
used in some special manner, or may have appropriated a particu-
lar design in which the figure of a star has assumed some special
form."
The change in the law from fancy to invented -word in 1888
made no difference in the rigidity with which the courts inter-
preted the question of distinctiveness.
Somatose,8 ' for an extract of meat, was rejected because of the
Greek word, owux, from which it was formed, though the court
admitted the word gave no clue to the character of the contents
of the article. Emolliolorum, from two Latin words, meaning "I
soften" and "a strap," " was held to be descriptive of a harness
dressing. "It is very possible that an ordinary Englishman would
not entirely understand the composition of the word, but, I think,"
said the Court, "it would convey to his mind the impression that
the substance so designated would act, by softening the articles
to which it is intended to be applied."
28 Waterman v. Ayres, 5 R. P. C. 240, 368.
2 9 Hanson Re, 5 R. P. C. 130.
30 lackson Re, 5 R. P. C. 180. This decision is questioned in Den-
shaw Re, 12 R. P. C. 75, 271. Romer J. there saying, "I should have
been inclined to think that the chance of the Chippewa Indians getting
these goods and being deceived was so remote that the Chippewa Indians
might have been left to take care of themselves."
31 Meyerstein Re, 7 R. P. C. 114.
82 Hodgson v. Sinclair, 9 R. P. C. 22.
83 Dexter Re, 10 R. P. C. 269.
'4Farbenfabriken Re, 1894-1 Ch. 645.
83 Talbot Re, 11 R. P. C. 77.
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None of these cases were taken to the House of Lords, but
that body was finally called to decide the question of descriptive-
ness in the case of the invented word Solio, used in reference 
to
photographic paper.
36 The decision was then made that the word
should be registered. Lord Macnaghten said, "It is no objection
to an invented word, that it may be traced to a foreign source, or
that it may contain a covert allusion to the character or quality of
the goods. It need not be wholly meaningless. A word is in-
vented which has never been used before and does not readily
convey to most people a particular meaning" Solio might be de-
rived from sol (the sun), solum (the earth), or solium (a throne).
This doubt practically showed that the word is invented. "The
quantum of invention," Lord Herschell added, "is immaterial."
Registry is not allowed as a reward of merit, but because no one
is deprived of the right to use the previously existing vocabulary.
Since the Solio case, the courts have been more ready to protect
words as invented. In upholding the claims of tachy-type for reg-
istry,37 the Judge said that an invented word need not be invented
by the applicants, nor need there have been any prior publication
of it in the jurisdiction. It may even have reference to the char-
acter or quality of the goods, if none but a scholar would know
what the word means.
The effect of the earlier cases, refusing registry to trade names,
was much diminished by the decisions in the Camels' Hair Belt-
ing Case, in which protection was given to those words and the
basis of the court's action placed on the broad ground of passing
off and fraud.3 8 -In the first of these cases, in which plaintiff's
goods were chiefly made of sheep andgoats' hair and defendant's
goods contained no camels' hair, the court said that the name may
be used by any one, if it denotes a particular kind of belting, but
that it was a proprietary name, if it denoted belting made only by
the plaintiffs. As the defendant used the name fraudulently, he
was enjoined.
In the second and more important case,
"9 a jury in the Queen's
Bench Division found that the defendant was passiig off goods
36 Eastman Co. Re, 15 R. P. C. 476, 1898 A. C. 571.
3" Linotype Co. Re, 17 R. P. C. 380; Cellular Co. v. "Maxton, 15
R. P. C. 581, 16 R. P. C. 397. An invented name has either no meaiing
at all, or none in relation to the goods it denotes.
38 Reddaway v. Bentham, 9 R. P. C. 503.
30 Reddaway v. Bentham, 12 R. P. C: 83, 13 R. P. C. 218. See Hall v.
Barrows, 10 Jur. N. S. 55.
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and leading purchasers to think that his goods were the plaintiff's
by calling them Camels' Hair Belting, which term was equivalent
in meaning to Reddaway's Belting. The Court of Appeal re-
versed this decision,: on the ground that Banham properly de-
scribed his belting by the term, as his goods were made of camels'
hair, but the House of Lords, on further appeal, restored the
Queen's Bench decision, holding that when words, which are de-
scriptive of an article, have come to denote the goods of a particu-
lar trader, he is entitled to restrain others from using them so as
to deceive. If the public can be deceived by Banham's calling
his goods Camel's Hair Belting, there must be some fallacy in
saying that he has told the simple truth. "The fallacy lies in over-
looking the fact, that a word may acquire in a trade a secondary
signification," and then is no less a falsehood in that trade, be-
cause of the fact that, in its primary sense, it may be true. The
falsehood lies in using.language which conveys a false idea and,
while one tradesman may not restrain another from the use of a
common English word, he may insist that. it shall not be used with-
out qualification, if such use would lead to fraud. Since the deci-
sion in Reddaway v. Bentham, in which decision, curiously enough,
no allusion was made to the question of deceptiveness, it had
been discovered that Reddaway's Camels' Hair Belting was really
made of such hair. This does not end the case by showing that
the words are merely descriptive. It is rash to say, a priori, how
far a.term is descriptive, without being familiar with the use of the
trade, and if the name was primarily descriptive, but has come -to
be understood to mean the manufacture of a particular maker, a
second maker may not use that name, for the effect of that use
will be to pass off the latter's goods for the former's, by means
of the duplicity in the trade name and to make them salable be-
cause they bear the former's trade name.
In two later decisions,' 0 Belting of Camels' Hair and Karmal
Belting were held to infringe Camels' Hair Belting. The latter
might not deceive in England, but would be apt to do so in
India, where Reddaway had a large trade.
It was feared by many that this" decision went so far that the
use of descriptive names would be seriously interfered with, but
the House of Lords, in the Cellular Clothing Case,41 affirming the
40 Redd way v. Ahlers, 19 R. P. C. 12; Reddaway v. Frictionless Co.,
19 R. P. C. 505.
41 Cellular Clothing Co. 1. Maxton, 15 R. P. C. 588, 16 R. P. C. 397.
(See Burgess v. Burgess, 17 Eng. Z. and Eq. Rep. 257.)
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decision below, carefully explained the effect of the Camels' Hair
Belting Case. The plaintiff is bound to establish that the technical
and secondary meaning is such as to exclude eviry one else from
using the word. This is a matter of fact, and not of law, and
was established in Reddaway v. Banham. If the defendant shows
that his name properly describes the goods, the plaintiff must then
show that it no longer means only what it says, but has acquired a
secondary and further meaning. The utmost difficulty should be
put in the plaintiff's way, as to give him an exclusive right to de-
scriptive words, confers on him a more valuable privilege than a
patent right. Chief Justice Fuller, in the Supreme Court of the
United States, commenting on the Reddaway 4 2 and the Singer 43
Cases, said that they "do not sustain the proposition, that words,
which in their primary signification give notice of a general fact
and may be used for that purpose by every one, can lawfully be
withdrawn from common use in that sense, but they illustrate the
adequacy of the protection from imposition and fraud, in respect
of a secondary signification, affordid by the courts. . . . There
may be such circumstances that subsequent users are bound to
distinguish their merchandise, and may be restrained unless they
couple with the use of the generic name, some caution suitable
to guard the public from confusing the sources of production."
In the United States, words originally descriptive in character,
especially when used in connection with a symbol, have been held
to be entitled to legal protection, when by long use the secondary
meaning,. identifying the goods as the particular preparation of the
tradesman," has become understood by the general public, as the
natural meaning of the words. 45 Thename may contain certain
elements of description, but the "originator is entitled to certain
proprietary rights in a name, which he has used to designate a
certain article and for which he *has built up a reputation."' 48
The most important question with distinctive names is whether the
public will be deceived 47 and one tradesman's goods passed off as
another's by the mere use of the word. One who has chosen a
42 Elgi Co. v. Ill. Co., 94 Off.-Gaz. 755. See Dadirrian v. Yacubian,
98 Fed. 872.
43
4 Heyman Ex parte, 18 Off. Gaz. 922; Wells v. Siegel, 106 Fed. 77
(Celery Compound) ; Mark Cross Co., Ex parle, 102 Off. Gaz. 623.
,5 So in Canada, Provident Works v. Canada Co., 2 0. L. R. 182.
4" Noel v. Ellis, 86 Off. Gas. 633.
4 7 Barber v. Manico, 10 R. P. C. 93.
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trade name is entitled to be protected against another 8 who seeks
to trade upon the reputation of his goods, but the word must be
used by one who deals in the article and it must indicate that the
article is his.'9 While it is especially important that the names be
different, if the goods are very similar in appearance,5 yet it is
no defense that the defendant does not dress up his goods like
plaintiff's. He must not use a name similar to one which "has
been so identified with the business of a manufacturer, as to in-
form the public that it means his product." 51 The courts frown
on all "filching attempts" to obtain another's reputation, and it may
well be that a thing is known to people by a "particular name,
without its being known to them" who is the tradesman whose
goods are denoted thereby.5 2 It is essential, however, to show that
the public understanding is clear respecting the use of the word,
before it will be protected as a proprietary one.53 In an early
case 5, in England where two men, neither of them the inventor,
claimed the right to sell Dr. Johnson's Yellow Ointment, Lord
Mansfield held that, as neither person has proven property to the
recipe, as the defendant had not sold his goods as those of the
plaintiff, and as the plaintiff did not use his own name, but
that of the inventor with the goods, no remedy should be given.
The mere fact that the word chosen carries with it a claim of
excellence does not indicate the choice of a word as arbitrary,"'
if the word is not a mere term of quality. "By close analysis and
ingenuity, you can find in almost any trade name a designation of
some quality connected with the goods," but this fact does not
make the name a descriptive one.5'
Baltimore, Md. Bernard C. Steiner.
Is Gaines v. Leslie, 54 N. Y. Supp. 421; Plant Co. v. May Co., 105
Fed. 375.
49 Formalin Co. Re, 17 R. P. C. 486.
0 oWolfe v. Nopitsch, 18 R. P. C. 27.
52 Fuller v. Huff, 92 Off. Gaz. 1620.52Bewlay v. Hughes, 15 R. P. C. 290.
33 Kohler v. Beshore, 62 Off. Gaz. 592.
" Singleton v. Bolton, 3 Doug. 293.
0 Plant Co. v. May Co., 105 Fed. 375.
58 Roberts v. Sheldon, 18 Off. Gaz. 1277; Du Boulay v. Du Boulay, 17
W. R. 594.

